When parliament gets it wrong : Mykoliw v. Botterill by Norrie, Kenneth
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Norrie, Kenneth (2011) When parliament gets it wrong : Mykoliw v. 
Botterill. Edinburgh Law Review, 15 (1). pp. 103-106. ISSN 1364-9809 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/35123/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 




Mykoliw and Ors v. Botterill and Another [2010] CSOH 84 
 
When Parliament gets it Wrong 
Kenneth McK. Norrie, University of Strathclyde 
 
There is no getting away from the interpretation of statutes.  However much our 
legislators (or, in truth, their draftspersons) try to cover every eventuality, there will 
be gaps remaining.  However hard they try to be unambiguous, their efforts will be 
frustrated by clever lawyers finding or creating double-meanings, obscure definitions 
and unlikely constructions.  The interpretative requirements in section 3 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 have enlarged the scope for finding and applying meanings 
that are apparently at odds with the words used and sometimes even with the intent 
with which they have been used.  We are all getting used to dealing with provisions 
that require to be interpreted in an unusual way in order to avoid violating the ECHR.  
Mykoliw v. Botterill involves a much rarer beast  -  a statutory provision which, it was 
clear to everyone, did not say what Parliament meant it to say.  It involved that 
much-amended statute, the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976, and concerned a 
question that many previous courts have been faced with ZKR FRXQWV DV ³IDPLO\´
within the definition given in that Act? 
In Telfer v. Kellock1 a woman was killed in a road accident and her partner sought 
damages, claiming title to do so under para. 1(aa) of Schedule 1 to the Damages 
(Scotland) Act 1976 RQ WKH JURXQG WKDW VKH ZDV ³OLYLQJ ZLWK WKH GHFHDVHG DV
KXVEDQGDQGZLIH´ Lady Smith dismissed the claim on the ground that the words 
³OLYLQJ ZLWK WKH GHFHDVHG DV KXVEDQG DQG ZLIH´ LQGLFDWHG unambiguously a 
parliamentary intention to limit qualifying relationships to those between a man and a 
woman and that, because the Human Rights Act 1998 was not yet in force, the 
courts were obliged to give effect to this intention and could not reinterpret it to 
                                               
1 2004 SLT 1290. 
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achieve ECHR compatibility.  In McGibbon v. McAlliser,2 on the other hand, 
reinterpretation was indeed required because the 1998 Act was by then in force.  
The 1976 Act includes parents in the category of persons who can seek damages for 
non-patrimonial loss on the death of their child, and at that time it also provided that 
affinitive relationships were to be treated as relationships of consanguinity.  This 
meant that step-parents had the same rights to sue as parents, as did parents-in-
law.3  The pursuer in McGibbon, was not a step-parent of the deceased but he was 
WKH PRWKHU¶V FRKDELWDQW and his argument, that to give the statute its ordinary 
meaning would be to discriminate against him on the basis of his marital status, was 
accepted by Lord Brodie. 
Mykoliw v. Botterill4 arose from the death of Kevin Michael Mykoliw, who was killed in 
a road accident.  The defenders were sued by various surviving members of Mr 
0\NROLZ¶V (slightly complex) family under the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976.  The 
case came before Lord Pentland on the Procedure Roll on a motion of the defenders 
for dismissal of the claim brought by one of the pursuers, Mr James Marshall.  He 
was mDUULHGWRWKHGHFHDVHG¶VPRWKHU DQGDVVXFKKDGEHHQWKHGHFHDVHG¶VVWHS-
father.  The defenders sought to have his claim for non-patrimonial loss dismissed 
on the ground that he was not a member of the deceased¶V ³LPPHGLDWH IDPLO\´
because the definition of that phrase had been changed since McGibbon and the 
legislation now unambiguously excluded all affinitive relations of a deceased person. 
It was accepted that, prior to amendments to the 1976 Act made by the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006, Mr Marshall would have had clear title to sue by dint of his 
status as step-parent.  But the wording in the Act had been changed as a result of 
the recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission in their Report on Damages 
for Non-Patrimonial Loss5 where they had concluded that the existing definition of 
³LPPHGLDWH IDPLO\´QR ORQJHUDSSURSULDWHO\ UHIOHFWHG WKHYDULHW\RI IDPLO\VWUXFWXUHV
that existed in Scotland today.  The law as it stood was both over-inclusive and 
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3 See for example Monteith v. Cape Insulation 1999 SLT 116. 
4 2010 CSOH 84. 
5 Scot. Law Com. 187 (August, 2002). 
3 
 
under-inclusive.  It was over-inclusive in that it permitted pursuers to trace their claim 
through relationships of affinity even when there was in reality no genuine closeness 
with the deceased that would justify an award for non-patrimonial loss.  And it was 
under-inclusive in that it excluded persons who did have that genuine closeness 
through having accepted the deceased as a child of their family.  The Scottish Law 
Commission therefore recommended changing the test from the existence of an 
affinitive relationship to acceptance of the deceased as a child of the FODLPDQW¶V
family.  This would exclude, for example, D SHUVRQ ZKR EHFRPHV WKH GHFHDVHG¶V
step-parent after the deceased grew up and left the parental home, but at the same 
time would normally include a person, whether or not married to or civil partner of the 
parent, who adopted a parenting role while the deceased was still a child being 
brought up in the parental home.  The Scottish Executive (as the Scottish 
Government then called itself) announced its acceptance of these recommendations. 
The Family Law (Scotland) Bill, as introduced in 2005, did not contain any provisions 
designed to achieve the recommended amendments in the 1976 Act but as that Bill 
was making its way through the parliamentary process someone decided that it 
would be a convenient opportunity to amend the 1976 Act in the way the 
Commission had suggested.  However, the wording used to achieve the aim was 
substantially different from that in the draft Bill DWWDFKHGWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V5HSRUW.  
Section 35(5) of the 2006 Act DGGHGWKH ³DFFHSWLQJDGXOWV´FDWHJRU\RI UHODWLYHV WR
the list of relatives in section 10 and schedule 1.  That was unproblematical.  The 
difficulty arose with the attempt to exclude step-parents as the sole basis of the 
claim.  Section 35(3) of the 2006 Act added a new section 1(4A) to the 1976 Act, 
providing bluntly and without qualification WKDW³1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJVHFWLRQRIDQG
Schedule 1 to, this Act, no award of damages under subsection (4) above shall be 
made to a person related by affinity to the deceased´  ³3HUVRQ UHODWHGE\DIILQLW\´
ZDVIXUWKHUGHILQHGWR LQFOXGH³DVWHSFKLOGVWHS-parent, stepbrother or stepsister of 
WKHGHFHDVHG´ 7KHUHVXOWRQD OLWHUDO UHDGLQJRI WKHDPHQGHG$FW LV WKDWD
person is given a right to claim damages for non-patrimonial loss if they had 
accepted the deceased as a child of the family but that right is blocked if they were 
related to the deceased by affinity.  This was not what was intended.  The intention 
was not to exclude step-parents absolutely, but to change the test that they had to 
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fulfil, from one of affinity to one of acceptance.  Mr Marshall in the present case had 
(he averred) accepted the deceased as a child of the family, but he was also related 
to the deceased by affinity.  So the question for the court was this: could section 
1(4A) be interpreted in a way that did not cut off his claim? 
In my commentary to the 2006 Act I said this: 
³7KRXJK WKH QHZ VHFWLRQ $ VXSHUILFLDOO\ UHDGV DV DQ DEVROXWH EDU RQ
affinitive claimants, that strict interpretation must be rejected.  For otherwise 
FRKDELWDQWVZKRDFFHSWHDFKRWKHU¶VFKLOGUHQDVFKLOGUHQRIWKHLUIDPLO\ZRXOG
have a claim while spouses and civil partners who did so would not.  Not only 
is this highly unlikely to reflect parliamentary intention, but it satisfies no 
legitimate aim.  As such it is permitted, even necessary, for the court to read 
LQWRWKHQHZVHFWLRQ$RIWKH$FWZRUGVVXFKDVµVROHO\RQWKHEDVLV
RIWKHDIILQLW\¶´6 
,HODERUDWHGRQWKHSRLQWLQ³5XVKHG/DZDQG:URQJIXO'HDWK´,7 which Lord Pentland 
IRXQG³LOOXPLQDWLQJ´DVKHDGRSWHGWKHVXJJHVWLRQ:KDWLVLQWHUHVWLQJLVWKDWKHGLG
so using the Human Rights Act only as a subsidiary argument. 
Lord Pentland found that article 8 of the European Convention was engaged 
because the right to sue based on the existence of sufficiently close family ties with a 
deceased person is an important aspect of family life, even if it can only be exercised 
after the death of the family member.8  He then concluded that to deny persons in 
the position of Mr Marshall title to sue for the death of a relative accepted as a family 
member, but to allow an unmarried de facto parent the right to do so would be 
discriminatory and incompatible with article 14 of the ECHR when read with article 8 
as achieving no legitimate aim.9  It followed that there was a requirement to read 
down section 1(4A) of the 1976 Act so that it was limited to situations where the only 
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connection between the claimant and the deceased was the formal relationship of 
affinity.10 
Lord Pentland had, however, already reached this result by applying the normal 
domestic canons of construction, which require the court to apply the literal meaning 
of statutory words unless to do so would lead to absurdity, anomaly or injustice.  The 
literal approach in the present case would do just that.  Counsel for the defenders 
argued that in such circumstances the remedy lay in legislative rather than judicial 
amendment of the clear words of the statute and in doing so they were arguing for a 
highly limited conception of the role of the courts. 
Lord Pentland dismissed this argument out of hand.  Given the choice between a 
literal and a sensible interpretation, he held that the court had the power to adopt the 
sensible interpretation especially where, as here, it was clear that the sensible 
interpretation consists with the intention of the Scottish Law Commission, who had 
explicitly stated that step-parents should be able to claim if they can prove that they 
had accepted the deceased as a child of their family.11  What is remarkable about 
this case is that the sensible interpretation could only be achieved by Lord Pentland 
reading into the new section 1(4A) a qualification that does not actually appear.  This 
was not a case of the court reading in words in order to make sense of a provision, 
or to resolve an ambiguity, but of a court actually changing its unambiguous 
meaning.  7KLV LV ³LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´RQO\ LQD VWUHWFKHGPHDQLQJRI WKDWZRUG though 
perhaps no more stretched than is permitted under section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998. 
It was fortunate that the true intent behind the amendment had been expressed so 
clearly by the Scottish Law Commission, and that the Scottish Executive had 
accepted that their recommendations should be given effect without qualification, 
omission or revision.  Not all cases of absurd statutory results will be as clear as this 
and courts in the future may well be faced with palpable absurdity but no clear 
guidance as to what rule to put in its place.  The Human Rights Act 1998 of course 
provides guidance in cases where Convention rights are engaged, but that will not 
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happen in every case and the courts will be left with having to construe the statute 
on the basis of what they think the legislation ought to say as opposed to what they 
know the legislature wanted it to say. 
